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NOTES
THE USE OF THE DISCOUNT RATE IN
EPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is responsi-
ble for protecting the public health and environment. Beginning in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress delegated this responsibility
and authority to the EPA through several environmental protection
statutes. Under these statutes, the EPA promulgates and enforces a
number of regulations designed to reduce emissions of pollutants in
order to protect public health and the environment including, air, wa-
ter and land.1 As a result, a national system of environmental regula-
tions has replaced nuisance suits and the common law as the primary
means of ensuring environmental quality.2
According to those who support the development of a national
regulatory system for environmental protection, common law liability
and nuisance litigation are incapable of controlling pollution in a
complex modern industrial society. On the other hand, there are indi-
viduals who advocate a decentralization of environmental manage-
ment and policy, if not a complete return to nuisance litigation, be-
cause they believe the current national system fails to achieve envi-
ronmental protection in an efficient, cost-effective manner.3 Notwith-
standing this important debate, this Note presumes that the national
1 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("CWA") of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992k (1994); Clean Air Act ("CAA") of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
2 See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
351 (4th ed. 1999) (asserting that a dramatic trend beginning in the 1960s was the development
of several national environmental protection statutes). See also JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 776-77 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the dominant role of the federal govern-
ment in environmental regulation since 1970); Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Common Law
Remedies and the UST Regulations, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 619, 630 (1994) (explaining
that with the enactment of statutes such as the CAA, the CWA, and RCRA, pollution became
regulated by comprehensive federal laws and regulations).
3 Perhaps no case has been cited more than Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d
870 (N.Y. 1970), for the proposition that common law nuisance actions can be used to effi-
ciently address environmental pollution problems. In Boomer, the court awarded permanent
damages, instead of an injunction, to plaintiffs in a private nuisance suit after balancing the
harm to the plaintiffs' property against the beneficial effects of the defendants' cement plant.
Id.
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regulatory system will not be phased out or discontinued. However,
many firms delay or do not comply with EPA regulations. Through-
out the remainder of this Note, the terms "delayed compliance" and
"noncompliance" are used interchangeably.
The environmental protection statutes grant the EPA the authority
to seek civil penalties for delayed or noncompliance. A critical com-
ponent of civil penalties is the economic benefits of delayed compli-
ance.4 Often there is a significant time lag between the occurrence of
a violation and enforcement followed by a penalty payment. During
this interval a firm may use the avoided costs of noncompliance to-
ward its next best alternative investment(s). A discount rate is used to
estimate the present value of economic benefits as of the penalty
payment date.
The EPA advocates using the weighted average cost of capital
("WACC") based on the principle that the economic benefits of de-
layed compliance include potential risk-related profits from alterna-
tive investment(s). Risk-related profits are potential profits that com-
pensate a firm for risk associated with its alternative investment. Pre-
viously, most courts accepted the EPA position.5 However, in a re-
cent case, United States v. WCI Steel, Inc.,6 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio accepted the alternative argument that
the risk-free rate was the appropriate discount rate.7 Use of the risk-
free rate does not capture potential risk-related profits.8
The resolution to this potentially emerging split among the courts
is important for several reasons. First, the two discount rates result in
substantially different estimates of the present value of economic
4 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §
7413(e)(1).
5 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 349 (E.D. Va. 1997),
aff'd, 191 F.3d 516,531 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) (affirming the district
court's use of the WACC to estimate the present value of economic benefit from avoiding the
cost of compliance). See also United States v. Roll Coater, Inc., [1991] 21 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,073, 21,075 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (finding use of WACC discount factor more
appropriate than alternative methods).
6 72 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
7 Id. at 830-31 (holding that the risk-free discount rate rather than the WACC is the cor-
rect rate to use in estimating the present value of the economic benefits of noncompliance and
that any profits earned in excess of the risk-free rate are earned not from noncompliance, but by
assuming risk).
8 Whether the WACC or risk-free rate is used, adjustments for related tax effects must be
made. See Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Noncom-
pliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,948, 32,950 (proposed June
18, 1999) (explaining that EPA accounts for tax effects by using after-tax cash flows to estimate
economic benefits of delayed compliance); Kenneth T. Wise et al., EPA's New BEN Model: A
Change for the Better?, 1993 Toxmcs L. REP. 1125, 1127 (explaining that the after-tax risk-free
rate is used in actual calculations to account for interest earned on avoided costs that were tax-
able).
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benefits of noncompliance. If the risk-free rate is employed, the esti-
mate can be lower by an order of magnitude, which may, as a result,
encourage forum shopping in order to ensure that a "friendly" court
hears the case.9 Second, the same group of expert economists has
appeared before different courts in support of these two approaches,
resulting in divergent judicial determinations as to which rate is ap-
propriate. Third, the literature in support of both the risk-free rate and
the WACC as applied to environmental regulatory noncompliance
tends to be dominated by those who are either interested parties or
expert witnesses in litigation. Finally, unlike previous assessments,
this Note investigates which discount rate is correct in light of the
legal doctrine of temporary takings and the underlying structure and
purpose of damages in tort actions. Interestingly, this emerging split
appears to be part of a larger debate among the courts about the ap-
propriate rate for pre-judgment interest to be applied to damage
awards. °
The remaining sections of this Note are as follows: Part I ex-
plains the important role of civil penalties and the discount rate in
enforcing environmental regulations, given the purpose of imposing
regulations; Part II explains the general role of the discount rate in
estimating present value; Part III outlines the mechanics of estimating
present value using the WACC and risk-free rate; Part IV shows that
economic and financial theory support using the risk-free discount
rate; Part V demonstrates that temporary takings and tort law are con-
gruent with economic and financial theory supporting the risk-free
discount rate; and Part VI recommends an approach for the appropri-
ate accounting of economic benefits and potential risk-related profits
from noncompliance in the context of civil penalties.
I. CIVIL PENALTIES, REGULATION, AND THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF
DELAYED OR NONCOMPLIANCE
The critical question this Note addresses is which discount rate,
the risk-free rate or the WACC, should be used to determine the pre-
sent value of ex post economic benefits, or those benefits a firm en-
joys from the time of delayed or noncompliance through the penalty
9 Of course jurisdictional requirements may restrict a firm's ability to forum shop.
10 Compare Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
interest rate on 52-week U.S. Treasury Bills to be applied to post-judgment interest civil money
judgments in federal courts, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, should also be applied to pre-
judgment interest in an ERISA suit unless the trial court finds that a different rate is appropri-
ate), with Smith v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 50 F.3d 956, 958 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding
that because the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 only addresses post-judgment interest, determina-
tion of the pre-judgment interest rate in an ERISA suit is left to the discretion of the district
court subject only to a review for abuse of discretion).
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payment date. For the reasons developed throughout this Note, the
conclusion is that the appropriate discount rate to use is the risk-free
discount rate (or a firm's cost of debt if it faced more than a mere
probability of bankruptcy during the period of noncompliance). The
risk-free rate separates economic benefits due to the illicit act of vio-
lating a regulation from potential risk-related returns.
Noncompliance with EPA regulations defeats the very purpose of
the regulation, which is the protection of human health and the envi-
ronment. Society is therefore unable to capture the increase in social
well-being. It is then necessary to ensure compliance through the im-
position of civil penalties. Penalizing firms through the imposition of
a civil penalty that includes economic benefits of delayed compliance
deters the target firm (i.e., specific deterrence) and other firms (i.e.,
general deterrence) from similar violations in the future."
In order to understand the important role that civil penalties play
in environmental protection, a brief explanation for imposing regula-
tions is needed. Regulations are imposed to correct for market fail-
ures such as negative externalities.' 2 In the context of pollution, nega-
tive externalities exist as firms fail to internalize the external cost of
pollution as a result of their production process. Consequently, the
quantity of goods and services consumed exceeds the optimal level.
The optimal level is where the marginal social benefits equal mar-
ginal social costs. This is displayed in Figure 1. Q* represents the
socially optimal level of output of good or service Q when a firm in-
ternalizes all costs of production, including pollution damages im-
posed on others. The associated market price is P*. Qo represents
output when a firm fails to internalize the external cost. The associ-
ated market price is Po. The distance between points B and C repre-
sents the marginal externality cost.
The failure to internalize the cost of pollution is shown in Figure
1. D is the marginal willingness to pay, which represents the value of
Q to consumers. MCp, the marginal private cost, which is less than
MCs, the marginal social cost, characterizes the firm's cost of produc-
1 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) (stating that the economic benefit component of a civil penalty is to
prevent violators from obtaining a competitive advantage through noncompliance); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 829 F. Supp. 1047, 1057 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (discussing in the
context of a RCRA violation "that the major purpose of a civil penalty is deterrence").
12 See TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 53-54
(3d ed. 1992) (describing the problem of externalities as causing a market failure because prices
do not adjust to account for pollution). See also SCOTT J. CALLAN & JANET M. THOMAS, ENvI-
RONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT: THEORY, POLICY, AND APPLICATIONS 81-84
(1996) (defining a negative externality as a spillover effect from either production or consump-
tion that extends outside the market and affects third parties who are neither the consumer nor
the producer).
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tion. The marginal social cost of production represents the cost of
producing goods and services after a firm internalizes the cost of pol-
lution.1 3 In Figure 1, the area ABCE represents the benefits of im-
proved public health and environmental quality as a result of a firm
internalizing the cost of pollution.
The EPA promulgates and enforces environmental protection
regulations in order to force firms to internalize pollution costs.
14
The cost of production changes from MCp to MCs. Triangle ACE is
lost profits as the quantity of Q produced and sold falls from Qo to
Q* due to this increase in cost. The difference between these two
areas, triangle ABC, is the net gain in social well-being.
Figure 1





13 See TIETENBERG, supra note 12, at 52 (defining MCp as the cost of production ex-
cludng the cost of pollution and MCs as the social cost of production that includes the cost of
pollution).
14 See RH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that in
the absence of transaction costs, polluters and non-polluters will internalize the cost associated
with negative externalities through bargaining and negotiation rather than government interven-
tion). However, due to the large number of affected parties, the Coase Theorem's assumption of
zero-transactions costs does not hold true for most, if not all, environmental issues EPA regu-
lates. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES
280 (1991) (describing Coase's assumption of zero transactions costs as unrealistic). Relatedly,
the Coase Theorem does not address another situation where environmental regulation is re-
quired, where there are potential "free-riders" who may seek the benefits of pollution reductions
without incurring any of the associated transactions costs.
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II. ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF DELAYED OR NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE
ROLE OF THE DISCOUNT RATE
For simplicity, assume here and throughout the rest of this Note
that the economic benefits of delayed or noncompliance are ex post
relative to the penalty payment date.15 A firm derives economic bene-
fits from noncompliance with environmental regulations by avoiding
the commitment of financial resources for pollution control. Eco-
nomic benefits are derived from two sources: (1) avoided capital in-
vestments required for the purchase and installation of pollution con-
trol equipment (e.g., scrubbers to remove sulfur emissions from fossil
fuel combustion), and (2) avoided operation and maintenance ex-
penses as a result of the initial choice not to install pollution control
equipment. A firm may apply these funds toward other investments
until a civil penalty is paid and compliance is required.
The role of the discount rate is to determine the present value of
economic benefits from noncompliance because there is a lag be-
tween a violation, enforcement, and payment of a penalty. The pre-
sent value is estimated by applying the compounded discount rate to
the avoided cost from the initial date of delayed compliance through
the penalty payment date. A court may choose the WACC or the
risk-free discount rate. With the decision in United States v. WCI
Steel, Inc., courts have taken divergent positions on which rate is cor-
rect. 16
III. ESTIMATING PRESENT VALUE OF ECONOMIC BENEFrT: RIsK-
FREE RATE vs. WACC
The mechanics of estimating the present value of economic
benefits using the risk-free rate and applying its retrospective ex post
analysis are:
15 In reality, we may have to account for economic benefits that would be expected to
accrue ex ante, or after the penalty payment date. For these benefits those who advocate use of
the risk-free rate for ex post benefits relative to the penalty payment date agree with the EPA
that the WACC should be used to discount ex ante benefits relative to the penalty payment to
their present value as of the penalty payment date. See Stewart C. Myers et al., The BEN Model
and the Calculation of Economic Benefit 5 (Mar. 1997) (prepared for the BEN Coalition and the
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association) (explaining that ex post analyses may
have to account for future cash flows whose value is not known with certainty, such as the cost
of equipment replacement based on necessary replacement cycles) (on file with author).
16 In rare instances, courts have applied discount rates solely based on the cost of equity
capital. See Atlantic States Legal Found. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 786 F. Supp.
743, 751 (N.D Ind. 1992). However, this Note does not consider this discount rate, as even the
EPA believes it should not be used to determine the present value of the economic benefits of
delayed compliance in enforcement cases. See Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of
the Economic Benefit of Noncompliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed.
Reg. 32,948, 32,959 (proposed June 18, 1999).
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ppd
PVPCE1 = Zi=1 Ci,on time* (1+k)pp -i  [1]
Equation 1, where PVPCEI is the present value of pollution con-
trol expenditures, represents the present value of pollution control
expenditures for on time compliance with an EPA regulation as of the
penalty payment date ("ppd"). Ci,on time is the cost of compliance that
would have been incurred for each period i. Additionally, k is the
risk-free discount rate and is used to determine the present value of
X-Ci,on time as of ppd.
ppd
PVPCE2 = Fj=l Cj,&Ieay* (1+k) ppdj  [2]
Equation 2 represents the present value of pollution control ex-
penditures in the case of delayed or noncompliance after the EPA has
required a firm to comply, also as of the penalty payment date. Cjdelay
is the cost of compliance incurred in each period from j through the
date on which the penalty is paid. k is the risk-free discount rate and
is used to determine the present value of ZCj,elay as of ppd. The pre-
sent value of the economic benefit is then calculated by subtracting
the value of equation 2 from equation 1.
The mechanics the EPA employs to estimate the present value of
economic benefits using the WACC and applying its prospective ex
ante analysis to expost benefits through the penalty payment date are:
ppd
PVPCE3 = L=1 Ci,n-time/(l+k) i_1 [3]
Equation 3 represents the present value of pollution control ex-
penditures for on time compliance with an EPA regulation as of the
original noncompliance date. Similar to the risk-free analysis, Con time
is the cost of compliance that would have been incurred for each pe-
riod i through ppd. However, the discount rate, k, which is used to
determine the present value of Z C,on time as of the original noncom-
pliance date is the WACC rather than the risk-free rate.
ppd
PVPCE4 = -j=l Cj,delay/(l+k)(+s ) -1 ) [4]
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Equation 4 represents the present value of pollution control ex-
penditures in the case of delayed or noncompliance after the EPA has
compelled a firm to comply, also as of the original noncompliance
date. Cjdelay is the cost of compliance that is incurred for each period
and s is the number of periods from the initial date of noncompliance
until compliance begins. After subtracting the value of equation 4
from equation 3, the last step in the EPA's analysis is to apply the
WACC and bring this value forward to determine the present value of
economics benefit as of the penalty payment date.
The choice of analytical framework and thus k is critical, given
the power of compounding, because a small change in the magnitude
of k can result in a significant difference in the estimate of the present
value of economic benefits from delayed compliance. The WACC is
significantly higher than the risk-free rate. A court's decision to use
the WACC or risk-free rate results in estimates of the present value of
economic benefits that are orders of magnitude apart.' However, this
choice must be based not on whether one favors higher or lower esti-
mates, but on economic, financial, and legal theory, and how such
theory comports with the purpose of deterrence underlying the impo-
sition of civil penalties. A review of relevant decisions shows that
except for the court in WCI Steel, courts provide no explanations
based on economic or financial theory regarding their choice of dis-
count rate.18
IV. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY JUSTIFIES THE RISK-FREE
DiscouNT RATE
Having described the options for estimating the present value of
economic benefits of noncompliance, it is now necessary to assess
which choice is correct based on economic and financial theory. The
WACC is a firm's weighted average cost of capital. Typically, a
firm's cost of capital is divided into the cost of debt (e.g., interest on
corporate bonds) and the cost of equity (i.e., rate of return on firm's
17 See United States v. WCI Steel, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 810, 830-31 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(showing that controlling for the type of remediation required for RCRA sludge management
violations, the estimated present value of the economic benefit using the WACC was $2.8 mil-
lion, while the estimate was only $732,000 using the risk-free rate). See also Robert H. Furh-
man, A Discussion of Technical Problems with EPA's BEN Model, 1 ENVTL LAW. 561, 576-79
(1995) (outlining several articles that assert that the risk-free discount rate is correct and using a
hypothetical example demonstrating that the WACC results in an estimated present value of
economic benefits of noncompliance of approximately $1.1 million, while the risk-free rate
results in an estimate of $485,000).
18 See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 349 n.17 (E.D. Va.
1997), affd 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 813 (2000) (stating that the
court was simply more persuaded by the testimony of the economic expert supporting use of the
WACC).
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stock) based upon a firm's capital structure. The cost of capital repre-
sents the cost of financing pollution control equipment purchases to
comply with environmental protection regulations or the opportunity
cost of foregone investments because of such purchases. 19 A rational
profit-maximizing company might choose not to comply with a regu-
lation if it could earn a rate of return equal to the WACC, especially
because pollution control equipment yields no actual monetary in-
come to a firm.20 Consequently, proponents of the WACC assert that
only by using this discount rate can all earnings be disgorged and the
violator made indifferent when deciding between compliance and
noncompliance.2'
The WACC includes a risk premium that captures and compen-
sates those who provide capital resources to a firm.2 The EPA rec-
ognizes the presence of a risk premium in a firm's cost of capital in
the EPA's own internal guidance documents.23 The risk is due to the
uncertainty of future cash flows or profits that an investment may
generate. The economic benefits of noncompliance are estimated
from the perspective of a firm making the initial decision not to com-
ply and use the avoided costs for an alternative investment expected
to earn a rate of return at least as large as the WACC.
However, if the amount of cash flow is known, there is no risk
and thus no need to include a risk premium in the discount rate. In
fact, this is the very point of those who support using the risk-free rate
because, by definition, enforcement actions are taken after the
avoided costs of delayed compliance are known. The EPA implicitly
19 See Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Non-
compliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,958.
20 Id. at 32,949.
21 Id. at 32,963-64 (explaining that capturing all of the economic benefits and returning
the violator to the financial position prior to noncompliance requires accounting for the rate of
return a company earns on the alternative investments made in lieu of purchasing and maintain-
ing poliution control equipment).
. See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 9 (describing the cost of capital as reflecting the risk
and uncertainty of future cash flows of an investment). See also vALTER NICHOLSON, MICRO-
ECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 250 (5th ed. 1992) (explaining that
the variance in potential outcomes for an activity proxies the economic concept of risk); Wise et
al., supra note 8, at 1127 (explaining that the cost of capital incorporates the risk of an invest-
ment); Kenneth T. Wise et al., EPA's "BEN" Model: Challenging Excessive Penalty Calcula-
tions, 1992 ToxICS L. REP. 1492, 1495 n.14 (discussing that the WACC is a risk-adjusted dis-
count rate in order to account for uncertainty in the amount of future cash flows). As applied to
the firm in the case of delayed compliance, the activity of investing avoided costs has more than
one potential outcome. The outcome may yield a high rate of return, providing the firm with a
significant payoff. On the other hand, the investment may fail, leaving the firm with a loss. The
risk premium in the WACC is the compensation the firm, and thus its investors, receive for the
willin,,ness to take the risk.
See U.S. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES ch. 9 (2000) (ex-
plaining that analyses of the economic impact of future regulatory compliance costs on firms
must use the firms' private costs of capital that reflect risk).
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acknowledges the accuracy of this statement.24 Consequently, there is
no uncertainty in the amount of avoided costs, and to compound for-
ward using the WACC would effectively compensate the EPA for
risk when no such risk exists.2 The economic benefits of noncompli-
ance are estimated from an ex post perspective based on a firm's ac-
tual avoided costs. The use of the WACC to estimate the present
value of economic benefits would compensate the government for
risk that it did not bear.26
The financial theory of applying the risk-free discount rate to
noncompliance finds its roots in the literature on tort law advocating
use of the risk-free rate to estimate the present value of damages for
wrongs committed in the past.27 Like an award for past damages in
tort, the avoided cost has occurred in the past and is thus known and
certain. The amount of the avoided cost need only be compounded by
the risk-free rate up to the penalty payment date to account for the
pure time value of money. The risk-free rate paradigm does not deny
that a firm might earn risk-related profits, or what some might refer to
as profits from arbitrage. However, it distinguishes such profits from
the present value of economic benefits of noncompliance.
24 See Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Non-
compliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,958 (showing that
the amount of the estimated financial gain from initial delay is the same, and is known and
certain under either approach).
25 See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 10 ("Assume the benefits of delayed compliance
have been identified. These benefits are now fixed past cash flows-there is no risk in hind-
sight. The only remaining step is to bring those cash flows to the present. ... IT]he risk-free
rate should be used. Using any higher rate would compensate the government for risks it has
not incurred."). See also Wise et al., supra note 8, at 1127 (explaining that the amount of past
cash flows are known and thus risk-free, requiring the use of a risk-free discount rate to deter-
mine present value); Wise et al., supra note 22, at 1495 n.14 (asserting that there is no uncer-
tainty associated with past cash flows, and thus a risk-free discount rate must be used to estimate
the present value).
26 See United States v. WCI Steel, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d. 810, 831 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("The
central issue is whether a rate reflecting risk should be used as to past benefits or obligations.
Any return above the risk-free rate is earned not from delay but by assuming risk, and therefore
is not properly considered economic benefit from noncompliance. Because this amount is
known and the existence and solvency of the party is also known, it is inappropriate to increase
the rate to reflect risk."). See also Myers et al., supra note 15, at 10 (explaining that a company
could place funds that would otherwise be used for environmental regulatory compliance in a
risky investment, but that any return over the risk-free rate is compensation for bearing the risk,
not a benefit from noncompliance).
27 See R.F. Lanzillotti & A.K. Esquibel, Measuring Damages in Commercial Litigation, 5
J. AccouNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 125, 134 (1990) ("In the case of past lost profits...
since the materialized cash flows are certain, the risk-free rate should be used to bring the past
lost profits to present value."). See also Franklin M. Fisher & R. Craig Romaine, Janis Joplin's
Yearbook and the Theory of Damages, 5 J. ACCOuNTING, AuDITING & FINANCE 145, 153-56
(1990) (arguing that making a plaintiff whole for a lost profit or destroyed asset, where compen-
sation is paid at a future point, requires a damage award equal to the value of the lost profit or
destroyed asset as of the time of injury compounded forward to the award payment date using a
risk-free discount rate to account only for the time value of money).
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Indeed, the EPA's advocacy of the WACC disregards the essen-
tial point of the retrospective expost view. The risk-free discount rate
is correct because of certainty in the amount of the avoided costs.
Judge Posner's decision in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.28 ad-
dressed an economic expert's estimate of the present value of the
plaintiffs lost future earnings due to invasion of her privacy as a re-
sult of an illegal publication of photos of her in Hustler Magazine.
Regarding this estimate, Posner wrote:
One [problem] is that in discounting to present value the
economist failed to correct for the extreme riskiness of the
earnings stream for which he was trying to find a present
value. An award of damages is a sum certain. If it is in-
tended to replace a stream of earnings that is highly uncer-
tain-surely an understatement in discussing [future] earn-
ings in the field of entertainment-then risk aversion should
be taken into account in computing the discount (interest)
rate. The riskless rate.., would be the proper rate if the
earnings stream that the damages award was intended to re-
place was one that would have been obtained with certainty.29
Unlike the plaintiff's future earnings in Douglass, the economic
benefit of delayed compliance is known and certain. Clearly, the risk-
free rate should be used to estimate its present value. Any return over
the risk-free rate is compensation for bearing risk, not an economic
benefit of noncompliance.
In addition, consider the position of a firm that has decided not to
comply with an environmental regulation. Other than putting avoided
costs under the mattress, the only way for a firm to ensure that the
funds derived from delayed compliance will be available to pay the
civil penalty is to place them in a risk-free investment such as a treas-
ury bond.30 If a firm places the funds in a risk-bearing investment,
any return over the risk-free rate is the reward for willingness to ac-
cept the risk. If the risky venture fails and all of the funds are lost, the
EPA will not waive the company's compliance requirement, and will
likely impose some form of fine anyway. In short, the risk-free rate is
appropriate since the EPA bears no risk from delayed compliance.
A related criticism of employing the risk-free rate is that it may
result in a negative estimate of the present value of economic benefits
28 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
29 Id. at 1143 (citation omitted).
3 See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 10 ("[F]rom the violator's point of view: what can
the violator do with the money during the period of noncompliance without taking on the risk of
losing all or a portion of it? The only answer is to invest in a risk free security.").
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from delayed compliance. The EPA provides an example in which
the use of the WACC results in a positive economic benefit, whereas
the use of the risk-free rate results in a negative estimate of economic
benefits.3 1 An unstated assumption is that a firm must obtain positive
benefits from delayed or noncompliance. However, there is no ra-
tionale in economic or financial theory to substantiate this assump-
tion. There is no reason that delaying expenditures must result in a
positive financial gain.
A priori, given the number of financial variables that can affect
expenditures, including potential changes in their value over time, the
difference between on time and delayed expenditures for pollution
control is intuitively indeterminate. For example, consider the choice
as to when to purchase a home. One might choose to purchase a
home today at current prices and interest rates, or delay the purchase
hoping that interest rates or purchase prices, or both, will decrease.
Unfortunately, it is possible that a "negative" benefit may result, as
only one or perhaps neither factor will decrease or even possibly in-
crease. When the present value of the two total purchase costs is
compared, there may be a negative benefit. Consider the position of
those who did not purchase a home in the early 1990s, prior to the
substantial increase in housing prices that occurred in the late 1990s.
Instinctively, under such a scenario, even after accounting for possi-
ble tax benefits of owning a home, it would not be shocking that a
buyer might experience a negative financial gain due to his delayed
purchase. Thus, it should not be surprising that a firm might experi-
ence a similar "negative" benefit from delaying expenditures on pol-
lution control equipment.
Notwithstanding the conceptual power of using the risk-free rate
for ex post benefits, one critical assumption underlies the use of this
discount rate. This assumption is that a firm does not face any risk of
bankruptcy. 32- As discussed below, if a firm has faced more than a
negligible risk of bankruptcy during the period of delayed compli-
ance, use of the risk-free rate would be inappropriate. A firm's cost of
debt, or the interest rate charged for borrowing funds from a bank or
through a bond issue, becomes the appropriate discount rate. 3 The
avoided costs due to delay are fixed and known and thus equivalent to
3 Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Noncompli-
ance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,948, 32,959 (proposed June
18, 1999).
32 See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 10.
33 See GABRIEL HAWAWINI & CLAUDE VIALLET, FINANCE FOR EXECUTIVES: MANAGING
VALUE FOR CREATION 303-04 (1999) (defining the cost of debt as either the interest rate a bank
charges a firm in exchange for a loan or the market yield to maturity for bonds the firm has
issued).
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a debt obligation. The only uncertainty is the risk of default, which
banks and bondholders include in either the interest charged or re-
quired yield. Synonymous with a typical borrower and a bank, a firm
is in effect the borrower and the government is the lender. 34 More-
over, due to the tax deductibility of interest payments, firms tend to
prefer debt financing to equity financing through the sale of stock.
3 5
If a firm has multiple debt obligations, a weighted average of the in-
terest rates or yield to maturities should be used to determine a firm's
average cost of debt.
There is no clear line that dictates when courts or the EPA should
employ the cost of debt as compared to the risk-free rate to determine
the present value of economic benefits. There is some probability
greater than zero that any firmn, even the most financially secure, may
have faced bankruptcy during the period of noncompliance. How-
ever, it is inequitable to assert that the cost of debt, instead of the risk-
free rate, should be used in all cases. Courts must make this determi-
nation on a case-by-case basis using all of the relevant evidence pre-
sented. Such evidence may include information concerning a firm's
liquidity,36 the market yield of a firm's bonds,37 and the yield spread
between the market yield of a firm's bonds over a government bond
with the same maturity.38 Courts may also consider the overall eco-
nomic state of the industry to which a firm belongs. The expost ret-
rospective analysis remains the same, regardless of whether the risk-
free rate or cost of debt is used. This Note will presume that a court
should apply the risk-free discount rate unless there is more than a
negligible probability of a firm having faced bankruptcy during the
period of noncompliance.39
34 See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 10. If the firm has multiple debt obligations, includ-
ing either bank loans and/or multiple bond issues, a weighted average of the interest rates or
yield to maturities should be used to determine the firm's average cost of debt.
35 See HAWAWI & ViALLET, supra note 33, at 372.
36 See id. at 67 (describing a firm's liquidity as its ability to meet its "recurrent cash obli-
gations towards various creditors" and noting that a firm that is illiquid is technically bankrupt).
37 See id. at 281 (explaining that the market yield is a measure of a firm's credit risk and is
used by bond rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's or Moody's to rate a firm's overall
credit risk).
38 See id. at 282 (discussing that large or growing yield spreads indicate that the firm is a
credit risk).
39 J. Huston McCulloch, an economist at Ohio State University, and Menahem Spiegel, an
economist at Rutgers University, agreed that either the risk-free rate or cost of debt was the
appropriate discount rate to use to determine the present value of economic benefits of delayed
or noncompliance prior to the penalty payment date. However, in their opinion, the cost of debt
should be used unless a firm had escrowed the initial avoided costs in a secure investment in a
risk-free treasury such as U.S. government T-Biils, because all firms have some probability of
entering bankruptcy.
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V. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS JUSTIFYING THE RISK-FREE RATE OVER
THE WACC
This section demonstrates that two legal frameworks, temporary
takings and tort jurisprudence, are congruent with the economic and
financial theory for using the risk-free rate to estimate the present
value of economic benefits in enforcement cases.
A. Delayed Compliance Is Synonymous with a Temporary Taking
Temporary regulatory takings occur when a government regula-
tion has temporarily denied the owner of an interest the ability to
make use of that interest. Analogously, when a firm delays comply-
ing with an environmental regulation, it temporarily "takes" the pub-
lic interest in a safe and clean environment, an interest described in
Part H, until appropriate enforcement actions are taken. Significantly,
temporary takings litigation demonstrates that for a temporary inva-
sion of another's interest, damages are awarded for actual damages
incurred and not those that are uncertain or based on speculation.
Moreover, just as the government's liability is limited to actual dam-
ages, a firm's liability for economic benefits measured from the non-
compliance date through the penalty payment date should be limited
to actual economic benefits. The risk-free discount rate is consistent
with this approach, while the WACC is not.
In First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles,n°
the Supreme Court recognized the existence of compensable tempo-
rary regulatory takings and defined takings as temporary because the
regulation is eventually "invalidated by the courts.' 41 Typically, the
situation is the government's denial of potential future development
to a landowner. 42 Though the Supreme Court in First English Evan-
gelical Church held that landowners must be compensated, it did not
prescribe a fixed method of estimating compensation. 43
Subsequently, courts have ruled that those subject to temporary
takings are entitled to actual damages only. In Corrigan v. City of
Scottsdale,44 while addressing the damages to which the plaintiff
property owner was entitled due to an invalid zoning ordinance, the
40 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
41 Seeid. at310.
42 See J. Margaret Tretbar, Calculating Compensation for Temporary Regulatory Takings,
42 U. KAN. L. REV 201,207 (1993) ("[T]he effect of an ultimately invalid regulation prohibit-
ing development of property held for future use is often simply a delay in development or an
impairment of the landowner's ability to plan for future development.").
43 See First English Evangelical Church, 482 U.S. at 321-22 (remanding the case for
further consideration without defining how to estimate the amount of compensation to which the
landowner was entitled).
' 720 P.2d513 (Ariz. 1986).
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court emphasized that the plaintiff was entitled only to provable ac-
tual damages.45 Similarly, in both Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v.
United States46 and Poirier v. Grand Blanc Township,47 the courts
denied lost profits as part of the plaintiff's damage award because
such profits were speculative. 48 In Yuba and Poirier, the courts stated
that the compensation the plaintiff was entitled to for actual damages
was best measured by the fair value of what was taken, which did not
include lost profits.
49
Like the government regulations in Corrigan, Yuba, and Poirier,
firms that delay compliance with EPA regulations and pollute the en-
vironment temporarily "take" the public interest in environmental
quality. This "taking" occurs until the EPA takes enforcement actions
to force compliance. As the plaintiffs in the temporary takings cases
are entitled to damages from the government, the EPA is entitled to
economic benefits of noncompliance. However, just as the plaintiffs
in the temporary takings cases are entitled only to actual damages and
were foreclosed from receiving compensation for speculative profits,
the EPA should be entitled only to actual economic benefits, which is
consistent with the language and intent of the environmental protec-
tion statues.50 Applying the concepts of actual economic benefits re-
quires the use of the risk-free discount rate to estimate the present
value of avoided costs from delayed compliance whose value is
known and certain:
[T]he language in environmental statutes and court opinions
indicates an intent to remove the actual economic benefit as-
sociated with noncompliance. The approach most consistent
with the statutes and opinions would take advantage of all
available information to determine the actual economic bene-
fit, not the expected economic benefit at the noncompliance
date. The calculations would use actual data from the past
(ex post) and expected data from the future (ex ante) to value
the on-time and delay cases as of the present.5 '
Based on the economic and financial theory described in Part IV,
the analysis in the quotation requires that the risk-free discount rate be
applied to the known and certain ex post avoided costs to estimate the
45 Id. at 519 (stating that such actual damages must be provable to a reasonable certainty).
46 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
47 481 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
48 See Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581-82; Poirier, 481 N.W.2d at 766.
49 See Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1581-82; Poirier, 481 N.W.2d at 766. But see Wheeler v. City of
Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267, 270-71 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiffs in temporary
takings cases are entitled to a market rate of return or foregone expected profits).
R See Myers et al., supra note 15, at 7.
5' Id. at 7.
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present value of economic benefits of delayed compliance through the
penalty payment. In so doing, the EPA is proscribed from collecting
speculative economic benefits that may have never materialized.
Though not a temporary takings case, Independent Bulk Trans-
port, Inc. v. Vessel MORANIA ABACO52 demonstrates why the risk-
free discount rate is appropriate for estimating the present value of
economic benefits in EPA enforcement cases. In Independent Bulk,
prior to obtaining an award for damages, the plaintiff was required to
expend funds to repair his ship, which the defendant's ship had dam-
aged in a collision. 3 The plaintiff had requested prejudgment interest
equal to its cost of borrowing funds. 4 In response, the court stated:
Plaintiff's position that prejudgment interest should be de-
termined through proof of what the particular plaintiff actu-
ally paid to borrow money during the relevant period is in
error. Consideration of the precise crealit circumstances of
the victim would inject a needless variable into these cases.
Plaintiff is entitled to the income which the monetary dam-
ages would have earned, and that should be measured by in-
terest or short-term, risk-free obligations.55
Clearly, the Independent Bulk court established that plaintiffs are
entitled to be compensated for the cost of money based on risk-free
investments for known ex post damages. The EPA's position that the
present value of ex post economic benefits should be calculated using
the WACC is inconsistent with the court's position.
B. Similar Goal and Comparable Structure of Civil Penalties and
Damage Awards in Tort Cases
The minimum goal of EPA enforcement actions, in order to deter
future regulatory violations, is to make a firm completely indifferent
toward compliance and noncompliance. However, this does not jus-
tify the artificial estimation of the present value of economic benefits
using the WACC. In torts, punitive damages are designed to ensure
that defendants are not better off after the legal process has con-
cluded. 56 As discussed below, the assessment of an appropriate "pu-
52 676 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1982).
5 Id. at 24-25.
4 Id. at 27.
5 Id. See also W. Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. Cent. Nat'l Ins. Group of Omaha, 730 F.2d 1280,
1288-89 (9th Cir. 1982) (approving of the rationale in Independent Bulk while deciding an
analogous case, which according to the court had been captured in application of the risk-free
rate for post judgment interest under 28 U.S.C § 1961 and thus such rate was also appropriately
applied as prejudgment interest unless substantial evidence required use of a different rate).
56 See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal
Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1990) (asserting that the amount of punitive damages depends
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nitive" component of civil penalties is the correct approach from a
legal as well as an economic and financial perspective.
In tort cases, compensatory damages are directed at deterrence.
This is the prevailing view among the courts.58 Further, the purpose
of punitive damages is punishment and deterrence.59 In Kalavity v.
United States,6° the court stated: "Damages are 'punitive' when
awarded separately for the sole purpose of punishing a tortfeasor who
inflicted injuries 'maliciousl or wantonly, and with circumstances of
contumely and indignity."' Further, the court in O'Gilvie v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc.62 explained that punitive damages are imposed
for willful or wanton conduct in order to restrain and deter others
from similar actions.63 Thus, it is inaccurate for the EPA to assert that
on the particular circumstances of a case with respect to the defendant, not the plaintiff). See
also Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L REv. 79, 89-90
(1982) (explaining that punitive damages are justified by the need to deter and punish those who
intentionally commit egregious harms); Jason Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of
Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1388-89 (1987) (arguing that courts have a
propensity to underestimate damages and that properly-set punitive damages can overcome
these errors and provide defendants with appropriate incentives and help achieve optimal levels
of deterrence).
57 See Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978) (explaining that ordi-
nary tort damages serve both a compensatory and deterrent function).
51 See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 342-43 (1999) (explaining
that the prevailing view among courts is that the purpose of compensatory damages is both to
compensate the plaintiff and deter the defendant). The minority view is that the purpose of
compensatory damages is to compensate victims and that punishment and deterrence emanate
solely from punitive damages. See Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981)
(asserting that there is a distinction between compensatory and punitive damages, and that if
punishment and deterrence are to be achieved it must be done through a separate award of puni-
tive damages).
59 See Pac. MuL Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991) (describing the purpose of
punitive damages as deterrence); O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir.
1987) (same); Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 (6th Cir. 1978) (describing the sin-
gular purpose of punitive damages is punishment and deterrence); In re Exxon Valdez, No.
A89-0095-CV, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12952, at *3 (D. Alaska Jan. 27, 1995) (explaining that
punitive damages are to deter conduct); Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 222 (Ala.
1989) (holding that the purpose of punitive damages is not compensate but to deter behavior);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 450 (Wis. 1980) (same). See also SHAPO, supra
note 58, at 358-59 (describing the role of punitive damages as serving to punish the defendant
and provide specific and general deterrence that have a "heightened behavior controlling ef-
fect").
60 584 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1978).
61 Id. at 811 n.1 (citing Milwaukee R.R. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 493 (1875)). See also
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1967) (describing the con-
duct that New York courts have found to support punitive damages as wanton, malicious, or
gross and outrageous); Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981)
(asserting that in Ohio punitive damages may be awarded for actual malice or malice that may
be inferred from intentional, reckless, willful, or gross conduct).
62 821 F.2d 1438 (10thCir. 1987).
63 Id. at 1446.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
the only "appropriate" focus in a tort action is compensating the vic-
tim.
64
Importantly, the Supreme Court has recognized the significant de-
terrent effect of civil penalties on noncompliance. In Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,65 the Court explained
that the purpose of a civil penalty for violation of the Clean Water Act
is deterrence. 66 Deterrence provides incentives not only for current
violators to come into compliance, but also for the current violator
and others to avoid future violations.67 Given that courts apply these
factors for violations of many of the environmental protection stat-
utes, it is clear that a purpose of civil penalties is deterrence.
Civil penalties have two components: economic benefits of de-
layed compliance and a dollar penalty to account for the severity of
the violation, including the violator's willfulness in delaying or not
complying with a regulation. 68  According to the EPA, the economic
benefit portion of a civil penalty constitutes "a critically important
element of deterrence." 69 The additional dollar penalty is imposed
over and above economic benefits in EPA enforcement actions to ac-
count for the severity of the violation and deter future violations.70
While using the risk-free rate may leave the violating firm with some
net gain due to potential risk-related profits, such profits are derived
from accepting risk and should not be included in the estimate of pre-
sent value of economic benefits. The fact that a violating firm may
derive some financial gain after accounting for the economic benefits
64 See Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Non-
compliance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,948, 32,958 (proposed
June 18, 1999).
6' 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
66 Id. at 706.
67 Id. at 707. Though beyond the scope of this Note, another potential explanation for
imposing civil penalties is retribution. See id. at 706.
68 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 300-F-00-002, LEVELING THE
PLAYING FIELD 1 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/oeca/oremed/. See also Hayward,
supra note 2, at 648-49 (explaining that the EPA seeks civil penalties to deter polluters from
violating regulations and resolves environmental problems by removing the economic benefit as
well as imposing further penalties over and above the economic benefit).
69 Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Noncompli-
ance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,958. See also EPA, LEVEL-
ING THE PLAYING FIELD, supra note 68, at 3 (asserting that federal courts have almost unani-
mously recognized the importance of economic benefit in setting civil penalties that will deter
firms from violating environmental protection regulations in the future).
70 Environmental Protection Agency, Calculation of the Economic Benefit of Noncompli-
ance in EPA's Civil Penalty Enforcement Cases, 64 Fed. Reg. at 32,958 n.21. See also EPA,
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD, supra note 68, at 3 (explaining that federal courts impose a
punitive component of civil penalties over and above economic benefits to achieve the goal of
deterrence).
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is analogous to the remedial outcome associated with compensatory
damages as applied to the environment.7 '
More important, the dollar penalty plays a directly analogous role
to pfunitive damages in traditional tort cases, which are used to make
the defendant indifferent toward committing or not committing an
illicit act. In United States v. Municipal Authority of Union Town-
ship,72 the court held that the goal of a civil penalty is to deter viola-
tors through the imposition of an economic benefit component and
punitive component designed to account for the willfulness or mali-
ciousness of the violator's activities.73 The court's language in Union
Township is directly comparable to language used to describe the un-
derlying rationale for punitive damages in tort cases.
Further, the factors courts and the EPA use to assess the amount
of the "gravity," a dollar penalty portion of the civil penalty are
analogous to those that courts employ in determining the reasonability
of the level of punitive damages. Specifically, the factors are:
(1) seriousness of violations;
(2) the economic benefit from the violation;
(3) any history of violations;
(4) good faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements;
(5) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator; and
(6) such other matters as justice may require.74
Factor (2) accounts for the economic benefit portion of the civil
penalty, while factors (1), (3), and (4) represent the gravity factors.
Factor (5) assesses the ability of violators to pay a penalty that may be
imposed. The EPA's internal policies for establishing the level of
71 See Haddock et al., supra note 56, at 17-18 (explaining that in thin markets such as
environmental quality, where transactions do not occur on a continuous basis through a regular
market, the awarding of compensatory damages leaves a defendant with a net gain).
72 929 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Pa. 1996), affld, 150 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1998).
73 Id. at 803-05. See also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 829 F. Supp. 1047,
1057 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (explaining that the "major purpose of a civil penalty [under RCRA] is
deterrence").
74 See CVA, 33 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1994). See also United States v. WCI Steel, Inc., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 810, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (showing that the factors to be considered under CWA are
the same under RCRA).
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civil penalties are consistent with those the courts follow.75 For ex-
ample, the factors the EPA considers in determining the amount of
civil penalties to pursue under section 311(b)(3) of the Clean Water
Act are:
(1) the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the
violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge;
(2) any history of prior violations;
(3) any other penalty for the same incident;
(4) any other matters as justice may require;
(5) the economic impact of the penalty on the violator;
(6) the seriousness of the violation or violations;
(7) the degree of culpability involved;
(8) the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting from the
violation.76
EPA guidance documents contain a disclaimer that they are for
internal purposes only and thus do not create enforceable rights by
parties in litigation with the EPA.77  Nevertheless, courts may con-
sider them in determining the final penalty amount. 78 This is consis-
tent with the doctrine that the final amount of a civil penalty is subject
75 The EPA's generic civil penalty policy for determining the amount of a penalty the
agency intends to seek essentially parallels the factors that courts consider. See EPA, LEVELING
THE PLAYING FIELD, supra note 68, at I (describing recovery of the economic benefit, plus a
gravity penalty, as the foundation of EPA civil penalty policy).
76 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CIVIL PENALTY POLICY FOR SECTION
31 1(b)(3) AND SECTION 311(j) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1998) (providing an example, pur-
suant to § 311(b)(8) of the Clean Water Act, as amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8)), at
http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/water/311 pen.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2002).
77 See Barnett M. Lawrence, EPA's Civil Penalty Policies: Making the Penalty Fit the
Violation, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,529, 10,531 (1992) (discussing that the EPA's internal guid-
ance documents cannot be cited to create rights in legal actions involving the EPA and may be
changed at any time without public notice).
'8 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 610-11
(D.S.C. 1997) (taking into account the defendant's own legal costs, along with the plaintiff's
legal costs that the defendant is responsible for, in setting the ultimate penalty to be paid).
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to the discretion of trial courts.79 Further, plaintiffs in citizens' suits
may use EPA guidelines to decide upon a negotiated penalty with a
firm that has violated environmental quality statutes and EPA regula-
80tions.
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,81 the Supreme
Court held that a set of factors established by the Alabama Supreme
Court (the Hammond factors) provides a sufficient and meaningful
review of the reasonability of punitive damage awards. 82 These fac-
tors are:
(1) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the puni-
tive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's
conduct as well as the harm that actually occurred;
(2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the
duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment,
and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct;
(3) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and
the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant
also sustain a loss;
(4) the "financial position' of the defendant;
(5) all the costs of litigation;
(6) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and
(7) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for
the same conduct, these to be taken in mitigation.83
79 See Tul v. United States 481 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1987) (holding that the setting of final
civil penalty amounts under CWA is left to the discretion of trial judges). See also United
States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 1999) (asserting that the trial
court's valuation of the civil penalty is reviewed only for abuse of discretion); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 829 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (explaining that assessment
of the amount of a civil penalty is determined based on the court's "informed" discretion).
so See Lawrence, supra note 77, at 10,531.
8, 499U.S. 1(1991).
82 Id. at 21-22.
83 Id. at 21.
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The Hammond factors are analogous to guidance that other courts
have offered in assessing the reasonability of the level of punitive
damages. In O'Gilvie v. International Playtex., Inc.,84 the court stated
that under Kansas law:
In assessing punitive damages the nature, extent, and enor-
mity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing it, and
all circumstances attending the transaction involved should
be considered. Any mitigating circumstances which may
bear upon any of the above factors may be considered to re-
duce such damages. In fixing an award of punitive damages
a jury may consider the amount of actual damages recovered,
defendant's financial condition and the probable litigation
expenses.85
Although there are some differences, the factors set forth in the
civil penalty sections of the environmental protection statutes and
internal EPA guidance documents demonstrate a remarkable similar-
ity. Clearly, the purpose and method for assessing damage awards in
tort law and civil penalties in enforcement cases, especially the puni-
tive component, are very much the same. Thus, if the EPA believes
that a civil penalty should include a firm's potential risk-related prof-
its, the agency should present the requisite proof and seek the imposi-
tion of an appropriate dollar penalty.
VI. INCORPORATING ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL RISK-
RELATED OR SECOND ORDER PROFITS INTO CIVIL PENALTIES DUE TO
DELAYED OR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS
Both the courts and the EPA should universally adopt use of the
risk-free rate, a new approach to incorporating the present value of
economic benefit and second order returns from noncompliance with
environmental regulations. Both financial and legal theory demon-
strate that the present value of economic benefits from the noncom-
pliance date through the penalty payment date should, as the court in
United States v. WCI Steel ruled, be calculated using the risk-free in-
terest rate from the initial date of noncompliance through the penalty
payment date.
84 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
85 Id. at 1446-47 (citations omitted). See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d
437, 461 (Wis. 1980) (explaining that either a trial or appellate court has the power to reduce
punitive damages to a fair and reasonable amount, and that a plaintiff whose award of punitive
damage is reduced may accept the lower amount or a new trial).
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Nevertheless, health and environmental quality policy concerns
suggest that courts and the EPA may consider a firm's potential risk-
related profits in setting the level of the gravity component of a civil
penalty. Indeed, some reasonable amount of punitive or gravity pen-
alty may need to be added to the economic benefits of delayed or
noncompliance in order to attain the appropriate level of deterrence.
86
The courts can consider potential risk-related profits through the
"such other matters as justice may require" factor contained in envi-
ronmental statutes. The EPA may adopt such a feature by amending
its current civil penalty guidelines.
However, this recommended approach would require both the
courts and the EPA to justify the inclusion of potential risk-related
profits as part of a civil penalty on a case-by-case basis. This recom-
mendation is consistent with the underlying premise of Judge Pos-
ner's opinion in assessing the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages
in Douglass: "The plaintiff should be required to establish, at least
within rough limits, the profits attributable to [the defendant's] viola-
tion of her rights."
CONCLUSION
This Note has examined whether the risk-free discount rate or the
WACC should be used to estimate the present value of the economic
benefits of noncompliance with environmental regulations that are ex
post relative to the penalty payment date. Financial and economic
theory, along with the legal jurisprudence in temporary takings and
the structure and purpose of civil penalties, dictates the use of the
risk-free rate. Use of the risk-free rate separates economic benefits
due to the illicit act of violating a regulation from the ability to invest
wisely. As part of a civil penalty, a court and the EPA may find that
deterrence requires penalizing firms beyond the present value of eco-
nomic benefits, through the imposition of a punitive component in-
cluding potential profits earned from bearing the risk of alternative
investments rather than complying with environmental regulations.
Thus, it is recommended that the courts consider the need to include
86 See Lynn M. Dodge, Economic Benefit in Environmental Civil Penalties: Is BEN too
Gentle?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 543, 552-54 (2000) (arguing that civil penalties should
include wrongful profits earned as a result of noncompliance with environmental regulations).
87 Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1145 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Dan
C. Dobbs, Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REv. 831, 866 n.91 (1989) ("But while
extracompensatory liability might be triggered on the basis of such a common sense estimate
[that misconduct is profitable], the measure of that liability is another matter and requires
proof.").
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potential risk-related profits through the "such other matters as justice
may require" factor.
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